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Get out your slide rules and compasses, boys and girls. We’re about to dissect the whats, the hows, and wherefores of the wonderful and wacky world of welfare reform! Please, try and contain yourselves.

Our story begins with this complaint from the Right: the White House has undone welfare reform!

According to headlines,

Obama Ends Welfare Reform As We Know It (Robert Rector and Katherine Bradley, National Review, 7/12)

Romney hits Obama move gutting welfare reform (Byron York, Washington Examiner, 7/13)

Obama administration ‘guts’ welfare reform with new HHS rule (Caroline May, The Daily Caller, 7/13)

‘Partisan Disgrace’: Obama Admin Quietly Rewrites Welfare Reform Law (Becket Adams, The Blaze, 7/13)

Obama to Clinton welfare reform: Drop dead (Jennifer Rubin, Washington Post, 7/15)

Obama Bids Farewell to Welfare Reform (Gerri Willis, Fox News, 7/17)

We also learned last week that

House and Senate Republicans introduced a bill Wednesday to prohibit the administration from implementing its latest policy … “eviscerating” planks from the 1996 bipartisan agreement on welfare reform.

Changing the law is one thing, but was it done extra-legally? According to Jennifer Rubin,

The list of laws [President Obama] won’t enforce or is unilaterally amending is getting long. …The latest and most inexplicable gambit is his decision to undo bipartisan welfare reform.

So what happened exactly? And whatever it was, was it illegal? And whether or not it’s legal, what does it mean and does it matter at all?

The implications are immense, but it was not illegal. In this article, I will first explain why the law allows President Obama’s unilateral move. I will then explain how the move undermines the much heralded welfare restrictions of 1996 and how it fits so well with White House welfare policies from the start of President Obama’s tenure.



The work requirements of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)are at the heart of concerns coming from proponents of welfare reform. President Clinton’s 1996 signature law forced states to put at least 50% of their welfare recipients through “work activities,” and proponents believe this requirement was essential for the subsequent mass migration into the workforce of former welfare recipients during the late 1990s. These proponents are now up in arms because the recent White House memorandum (July 12) from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) offered states a waiver from their work requirements.

What was the stated legal justification? HHS claimed authority under §1115 of the Social Security code to waive the work requirements. But the work requirements are stated in §407, which §1115 conspicuously does not cover. However, HHS (brilliantly, in my opinion) located a loophole: it turns out §1115 does allow the waiver of §402, which itself implements the work requirements of §407.

So if HHS has authority to waive any requirements in §402, it has authority to waive the teeth out of the work requirements in §407. Here is the language giving the Secretary of HHS that very authority under §1115: “the Secretary may waive compliance with any of the requirements of section 2, 402, 454, 1002, 1402, 1602, or 1902, as the case may be, to the extent and for the period he finds necessary.”

The work requirements of §407 can therefore be legally waved. Here is how the HHS memo puts it:

Section 1115 authorizes waivers concerning section 402.  Accordingly, other provisions of the TANF statute are not waivable.  For example, the purposes of TANF are not waivable, because they are contained in section 401.  The prohibitions on assistance are not waivable, because they are contained in section 408.

While the TANF work participation requirements are contained in section 407, section 402(a)(1)(A)(iii) requires that the state plan “[e]nsure that parents and caretakers receiving assistance under the program engage in work activities in accordance with section 407.”  Thus, HHS has authority to waive compliance with this 402 requirement and authorize a state to test approaches and methods other than those set forth in section 407, including definitions of work activities and engagement, specified limitations, verification procedures, and the calculation of participation rates.

All signs indicate this move to be legal. Whether it is good policy is another question entirely.


In 2005, work requirements were tightened by Congress. According to Rubin, this was in response to the following findings:

the nonpartisan Government Accountability Office reported that several states listed as part of their definition of a ‘federal work activity’ under TANF the following:

  1. Bed rest
  2. Personal care activities
  3. Massage
  4. Exercise
  5. Journaling
  6. Motivational reading
  7. Smoking cessation
  8. Weight loss promotion
  9. Participating in parent teacher meetings
  10. Helping a friend or relative with household tasks and errands.

Working requirements must be present, they must be tough, and they must be enforced, so the argument goes.

But Rubin’s colleague Ezra Klein at the Washington Post protests that this recent change is nothing to be concerned about:

The stated intention is to allow states more room to try programs that promote employment for welfare recipients in the face of the recession. The actual language is rather strict and rules out a number of potential waiver applications. For example, the memo states, “The Secretary will not use her authority to allow use of TANF funds to provide assistance to individuals or families subject to the TANF prohibitions on assistance.” Translation: people who aren’t on TANF because they didn’t meet the work requirements aren’t going to get bailed out here.

This is simply disingenuous. True, the prohibitions on assistance he refers to are in §408, which are not subject to waiver. However, these prohibitions on assistance are not work requirements. If they were, then the work requirements of §407 would be superfluous. Indeed, the entire HHS memo would be an embarrassing waste of time. It is not helpful to pretend that a policy lifting work requirements will not effectively lift work requirements, without further exposition.

Klein also notes:

Proposed waivers also must include concrete methods of evaluating performance, and set standards that the new programs must meet for the waiver to continue.

To paraphrase Klein, one man’s concrete methods of evaluation is, of course, another man’s free-for-all. As noted above, the HHS memo requires things like “definitions of work activities and engagement, specified limitations, verification procedures, and the calculation of participation rates.” These requirements are further detailed at the bottom of the memo.

The implication that any of these requirements will subject the states to any substantial limit is a wild guess at best and is made with willful disregard of the mechanics of government at worst. This is especially true because the memo is just a letter — a ‘heads up’ to the states — without the force of law. In a nation governed by waivers, this kind of naïve, unquestioning analysis just won’t do.

Klein notes other potential positives of this welfare “tweak,” such as financial protection for some in need.

Assuming welfare to be a net benefit for its recipients, granted.

However, if our concern, for whatever reason, is the expanding of welfare payments at the expense of work requirements — the very concern that made welfare reform popular in the first place — the policy directive in this memo is anathema.

Make no mistake: we have just experienced an about-face of welfare reform.


If you thought this just couldn’t get any more riveting — if you thought only the first drop on a roller coaster at a Red Hot Chili Peppers concert could top this — oh, it’s going to get so much better! It’s time for some context before we cover what the Obama Administration has been doing with welfare reform since its very first days in office.

What do we mean by “welfare”? It is now a widely-known fact that net welfare entitlements have skyrocketed in recent years. An April CATO paper notes the explosion:

In 2011 the federal government spent roughly $668.2 billion on [all welfare programs]. That represents an increase of more than $193 billion since Barack Obama be­came president. This is roughly two and a half times greater than any increase over a similar time frame in U.S. history, and it means an increase in means-tested welfare spending of about 2.4 percent of GDP. If one includes state and local welfare spend­ing, government at all levels will spend more than $952 billion this year to fight poverty. To put this in perspective, the defense bud­get this year, including spending for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, totals $685 billion. (CATO, p.2)

The paper goes on to detail some of the loosening of eligibility requirements and reports projected costs of welfare over the coming decade:

According to Obama administration pro­jections … [b]y 2014 [combined federal and state welfare] spending is likely to equal $1 trillion per year and will total $10.3 trillion over the next 10 years. According to these projections, over the next 10 years, federal and state governments will spend $250,000 for every American currently living in pov­erty, or $1 million for every poor family of four. And that does not include spending under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which will dramatically increase the number of low-income Americans par­ticipating in Medicaid. (CATO, p.8)

The same paper details that combined federal and state welfare since LBJ’s 1964 promise to fight poverty totals nearly $15 trillion. This means the projections for the next 10 years ($10.3 trillion) equal more than 69% of the last 40 years of spending.

That’s total welfare. However, this article’s object is not total welfare, but only the single program that was reformed in 1996 and whose reform was just “gutted” by the HHS memo.

This program, the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) is only one of 126 welfare programs. It is one of the top 10 most expensive of the programs, but it is still nowhere near as large as the top two, Medicaid and SNAP (food stamps). CATO provides us with a chart of total costs from 2011 among the most expensive programs:

And the number of recipients per program:

Obviously, TANF is by no means our greatest concern regarding unvarnished welfare spending.

To my mind, then, TANF is not itself a crisis, unless it expands astronomically. However, as the numbers in the CATO paper indicate, the entire welfare establishment of 126 programs is in crisis and any expansion in any program does contribute to the problem. Indeed, CATO details several recently-expanded programs, including TANF. This is why an eye on TANF is important, but always in conjunction with its sister programs.


To understand the last three years of TANF, a short stroll through the glorious days of the 1990s will clear a few things up.

We begin with Barack Obama’s opinion of welfare reform. Here is Byron York:

when a real attempt to break through that culture of dysfunction — the landmark 1996 welfare-reform bill…— came up, Obama vowed to use all the resources at his disposal to undo it. “I made sure our new welfare system didn’t punish people by kicking them off the rolls,” he said in 1999. Two years earlier, he had declared: “We want to make sure that there is health care, child care, job training, and transportation vouchers — everything that is needed to ensure that those who need it will have support.”…

Obama’s professional colleagues, people like Jerry Kellman, believe his lasting accomplishment was to build an organization, the Developing Communities Project, that survived his departure. … It has become, much more than it was when Obama was there, a grant-getting institution; according to tax records, about three-quarters of its funding comes from government grants

To recap, TANF is the post-reform moniker of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which gained its unpopularity because too few strings were attached to its welfare benefits, and too many people were taking advantage of readily-available tax funds. This program was colloquially considered “welfare,” even though it is only one of many welfare programs.

And so, part of the 1996 Clinton welfare reform was the mandate that, in order for states to receive federal funding, at least half of their recipients had to be involved in some kind of “work activity” (i.e. workfare, job search, training), as defined in §407.

The states’ hands were tied to the work requirement. But if one state had 10,000 people on welfare and 5,000 dropped off the rolls because the work requirement drove them into a job, the state would still have 5,000 recipients left and would have to force half of them into work activities as well, until a de facto 100% work requirement materialized.

In order to avoid this impossible iterative regression, the 1996 reform included a “caseload reduction credit.” The 5,000 workers who left the welfare rolls would still be counted as workers toward the work requirement, and states would be rewarded for their successful efforts in moving recipients into jobs. Here is the mechanism for counting lost welfare beneficiaries:

The Secretary shall prescribe regulations for reducing the minimum participation rate otherwise required by this section for a fiscal year by the number of percentage points equal to the number of percentage points (if any) by which—

(i)     the average monthly number of families receiving assistance during the immediately preceding fiscal year * under the State program … is less than

(ii)    the average monthly number of families that received assistance under the State program referred to in clause (i) during fiscal year 1996**. [§407(b)(3)(A)]

 *amended by the 2009 Stimulus (see below)

**amended in 2005 to be “fiscal year 2005”

In short, the HHS Secretary will take the number of families on welfare in 1996, subtract the amount still on welfare in a subsequent year, and use that difference to credit the state for the number of families that have left welfare rolls.

That was the caseload reduction credit and it is generally considered to have successfully induced states to reduce their caseloads by pursuing work requirements.


As mentioned above, TANF requirements were strengthened in 2005. However, the 2009 Stimulus was the first major turn-around for the program since its 1996 reform.

The Stimulus, or the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which was passed all the way at the start of President Obama’s term (February 17, 2009), reserved a $5 billion block grant to be used to pay 80% of the excess state TANF caseloads:

the amount of the grant to be made to a State … shall be an amount equal to 80 percent of the amount (if any) by which the total expenditures of the State for basic assistance (as defined by the Secretary) … exceeds the total expenditures of the State for such assistance [§2101(a)(1)(3)(A)(iii), p. 446]

The funding was thus tied to increased caseloads, rather than to some measure of need, like increased unemployment or level of poverty.

At the time, Robert Rector and Katherine Bradley at the Heritage Foundation made an important distinction:

Proponents of the stimulus plan might argue that these changes are necessary to help TANF weather the current recession. This is not true. Under existing TANF law, the federal government operates a TANF “contingency fund” with nearly $2 billion in funding that can be quickly funneled to states that have rising unemployment. It should be noted that the existing contingency fund ties increased financial support to states to the objective external factor of unemployment; it specifically avoids a policy of funding states for increased welfare caseloads, recognizing the perverse incentives this could entail.

If the authors of the stimulus bills merely wanted to provide states with more TANF funds in the current recession, they could have increased funding in the existing contingency fund. But they deliberately did not do this. Instead, they completely overturned the fiscal and policy foundations of welfare reform.

Either this was a major oversight by White House lawyers or they were indeed intent on undoing the structure of TANF for the express purpose of undoing the structure of TANF.

Additionally, the 80% payment is at the high end of what the federal government paid state governments for AFDC coverage, which in 1995 was anywhere from 50% to 74%. The 80% Stimulus provision was certainly a brazen step in several directions — and all before President Obama’s tenure began losing its first baby teeth.

On the other hand, there were some limitations on the Stimulus changes to TANF. The granting power for the “Emergency Fund” was subject to a 1.5-year limitation ending September 2010:

In no case may the Secretary make a grant from the Emergency Fund for a fiscal year after fiscal year 2010. [§2101(a)(1)(2)(C), p. 446]

(Fiscal years end on the October of their year so FY2010 lasts until late September 2010.)

The new granting power was also subject to the further limitation of the state’s finances: whatever is the size of its annual TANF program, the Stimulus fund cannot pay more than half of it over the course of two years:

The total amount payable to a single State … for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 combined shall not exceed 50 percent of the annual State family assistance grant. [§2101(a)(1)(5), p. 448]

I cannot find which year the “annual State family assistance grant” refers to and whether it refers to all of TANF or part of it, but we might as well stop nitpicking here and be charitable enough to allow that the temporary welfare expansion in the Stimulus was limited both by time (1.5 years) and money (50% of annual grants per state).

However, the fact remains that the Stimulus had, for the first time since 1996, incentivized the increase of caseloads, for caseloads’ sake. One thing held this shift back: the caseload reduction credit, which was so critical in incentivizing the states to lessen their caseloads back in 1996. The question here was, if caseloads expanded in response to the Stimulus’ 80% federal welfare bonus, wouldn’t the caseload reduction credit be unable to protect the states’ funding? Would not the work requirements then kick in and force funding away from the states?

The solution in the Stimulus legislation was to suspend the critical 1996 caseload requirement temporarily by throwing the following clause into §407(b)(3)(A)(i), which is asterisked above:

“(or if the immediately preceding fiscal year is fiscal year 2008, 2009, or 2010, then, at State option, during the emergency fund base year of the State with respect to the average monthly assistance caseload of the State (within the meaning of section 403(c)(9)), except that, if a State elects such option for fiscal year 2008, the emergency fund base year of the State with respect to such caseload shall be fiscal year 2007))” [§2101(b), p. 448-9]

What does this gobbledygook mean? Let’s take it one step at a time.

According to the original 1996 law, if it is currently 2009 or 2010 or 2011, the state may look to the “immediately preceding fiscal year” — 2008, 2009, 2010 — for their caseload data. Instead, this amendment allowed the state to forget about the “immediately preceding fiscal year,” and go back instead for their caseload data to 2007 or 2008, which is referred to as the “emergency fund base year,” as defined here:

The term “emergency fund base year” means … whichever of fiscal year 2007 or 2008 is the fiscal year in which the amount described by the category with respect to the State is the lesser. [§403(c)(9)(B)(i)]

But as it says in the previous excerpt from the Stimulus amendment, “if a State elects such option for fiscal year 2008, the emergency fund base year of the State with respect to such caseload shall be fiscal year 2007.”

The bottom line is that the Stimulus gave states the option to either stick with their current and real data points or use their 2007 (smaller) caseload data, in order to pretend that their caseloads have not increased, when, in fact, they had increased, due to the 80% Stimulus welfare bonus for increased caseloads. This was an option available during fiscal years 2009, 2010, and 2011.

Because fiscal years end on the September of their year, this program ended at the end of FY2011, or September 2011. Indeed, the caseload reporting exemption in §2101(b) was struck from the text by §2101(d)(2), which is explicitly effective October 1, 2011.

To summarize where we’ve been so far: the 80% Stimulus TANF bonus, defined by a $5 billion total block grant, was subject to a 1.5-year limit (Feb 2009 – Sept 2010) and another limit having to do with specific state welfare budgets. Meanwhile, the caseload reporting exemption we just explored lasted 2.5 years (Feb 2009 – Sept 2011).

According to HHS, all $5 billion of Stimulus bonus welfare funds were drawn down by the states within the two-year limit.

So what happened in FY2011 from October 1, 2010, to September 30, 2011? The caseload reporting exemption remained, but Stimulus funds had run out.

This is where it gets interesting. During FY2011 and our current FY2012, it appears the Obama Administration has not been able to extend the TANF bonus. According to CLASP, a policy group for low-income people,

The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families block grant program was scheduled for reauthorization in 2010. Congress, however, did not work on legislation to reauthorize the program and instead extended the TANF block grant multiple times. The most recent bill, the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act (H.R. 3630), extends the block grant through the end of fiscal year 2012 (September 30, 2012). Previous extensions included: the Claims Resolution Act (P.L. 111-291), H.R. 2943, and a two-month extension through February 29, 2012.

[These extensions] did not include the TANF Emergency Fund, created by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.


For a year and a half, then, the Obama Administration has not successfully extended TANF as they would like — without work requirements. The Stimulus was able to extend TANF by $5 billion over two years without work requirements, but between October 2010 and today, not only was the bonus not extended, but, with a Congress unable to pass an annual budget, it hasn’t even been easy extending even the old, boring TANF program.

This must be exceedingly frustrating for President Obama, who, as early as 1999, was waging an admirable war against welfare restrictions. He must be particularly nonplussed with the fact that between 1990 and 2008, “[e]x­penditures for every program except TANF increased in real terms.” (CATO, p.6) If one’s goal is the extension of welfare, then TANF is the single greatest welfare failure of the past two decades.

President Obama has obviously been far more successful in extending other welfare programs. His troubles with TANF are only ever more stark when compared with his success, for example, in increasing food stamps, or the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) over the course of the last three years: “enrollment [in SNAP] increased by 12 million people, while spending increased by $30 billion.” (CATO, p. 8) A record 45.8 million recipients now benefit from SNAP.

With such a juxtaposition, and in conjunction with the history thus recounted, is it really such a surprise that President Obama simply decided to unilaterally lift the TANF work requirements this month? A better question is why he waited all this time.


It was literally like realizing Santa Claus does not exist. For years, I would arrive at the facts by checking and mindlessly following their pronouncements of “true” or “false.” It was easy and socially acceptable.

But no longer.

The Snopes article in question debunks Glenn Beck’s June 21, 2010 program, in which Beck details a conspiracy tying President Barack Obama’s moratorium to George Soros’s bank account.

(Beck does a nice introduction on the general conservative view of George Soros, in case you’re wondering who the dude is. In a nutshell, Soros is the root of all evil to the Right, for he uses his multinational wallet to fund organizations, campaigns, think tanks, etc. on the Left.)


The order of events goes as follows: Soros buys tons of stock in national Brazilian oil company Petrobras in 2008 >>> Obama loans tons more money to Petrobras in 2009 >>> Obama establishes his Gulf oil drilling moratorium >>> Petrobras stands to profit >>> George Soros stands to profit.

Pretty simple to follow. Assiduous news hounds with impeccable memories wouldn’t be surprised by this, but, fortunately or unfortunately for us lazy folk, there’s Glenn Beck’s show.

Immediately after Beck’s show on the matter, Snopes, MediaMatters, and FactCheck came out with their own versions of generally similar myth-busting information: Soros had been decreasing his Petrobras holdings within the year before Obama’s loan; it wasn’t even “Obama’s loan,” in that it was made by Bush appointees at the Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank; Petrobras can only use the loaned money to buy American products, so this move is there to help American jobs. …It’s not evil. It’s strictly business.

I am not interested in MediaMatters or FactCheck, because they have long ago proven their selectivity and partisanship.

But Snopes…??

The cognitive dissonance was too much, so I did my own sniffing around.


The first, most important detail to acknowledge is that Soros’s stake in Petrobras is currently his single largest stake.

Snopes claims that Soros sold off 5 million Petrobras shares in May 2009 (just after the Ex-Im loan). But according to information from the end of June 2009, these were his holdings:

  1. Petroleo Brasileiro S.A.Petrobras (PBR) – 9,818,323 shares, 15.42% of the total portfolio
  2. Hess Corp. (HES) – 5,123,198 shares, 10.56% of the total portfolio
  3. Petroleo Brasileiro S.A.Petrobras (PBR-A) – 5,884,700 shares, 7.53% of the total portfolio
  4. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan Inc. (POT) – 1,978,053 shares, 7.06% of the total portfolio
  5. Plains Exploration & Production Company (PXP) – 6,526,400 shares, 6.84% of the total portfolio

This means that the loan was made when Petrobras was dominating Soros’s portfolio.

Snopes also claims that Soros sold 22 million more stocks in August 2009. Something about the math seems fuzzy to this finance amateur, given all the above figures, but regardless! After all is said and done, by the end of September 2009, Petrobras still filled 7.7% (7.4 million shares) of Soros’s portfolio, maintaining it as his largest investment.

[Tickerspy looks like it has the most recent information. At the time of this writing, it seems Soros has increased his holdings in Petrobras to 9.1 million shares, though it is now his second largest investment (after SPDR Gold Trust). I do not know, however, if this is Soros’s only fund, and I’m probably missing some nuances here; again, finance is not my specialty. If someone could handle these details and let me know, I will update this post.]

Additionally, Snopes does not mention that the latter transaction (and the link that Snopes provides) distinguishes between the 22 million common shares that Soros sold and the 5.8 shares of preferred stock that he bought (preferred stock pays higher dividends, is less expensive, is safer, and in this case allows Soros to diversify his portfolio). Besides not making this relevant distinction, Snopes does not even mention the 5.8 million preferred shares that were bought, nor does Snopes indicate the proper perspective: Soros’s total interest in Petrobras, which is, by all accounts, substantial.


Indeed, the Export-Import Bank’s press releases and the words of the head of the bank dominate the Snopes article. This is certainly not the most trustworthy source, particularly if they are trying to cover up something as egregious as the accusation of our government colluding with a financier at the expense of a struggling economy. But you decide…

The Chairman and President of the bank, Fred P. Hochberg, made the case that “Ex-Im Bank does not make U.S. policy. In fact, our charter prohibits us from turning down financing for either nonfinancial or noncommercial reasons, except in rare circumstances including failure to meet our environmental standards.”

This is not relevant. The Petrobras loan is of a fully financial and commercial nature. Therefore, Ex-Im could have turned the loan down for any reason. Of course, they did not. They did, however, turn down a different loan recently:

Earlier this year, Ex-Im was asked to loan the development of a plant in India, which would use the products of Wisconsin jobs. $600 million and 1000 jobs were on the line, according to the Wall Street Journal. The reasoning behind the loan denial was that the coal mine used to build the plant was environmentally unfriendly.

Yet the Petrobras loan subsidized an oil company. Additionally, the Petrobras deal was worth $2 billion (with a “B”; read below for actual figure at $10 billion). Furthermore, the Petrobras loan was in exchange for jobs and products that had not yet been agreed to. This means that no American jobs or economic help was really guaranteed at the time of the loan approval, as opposed to the $600-million/1000-job Wisconsin/India deal. Yet despite both deals being similarly environmentally unfriendly, only one is turned down by the bank for environmental concerns.

All this means is that any statement by the Ex-Im Bank about environmental obligations and criteria to support loans — financial or otherwise — is merely inconsistent posturing. It is this source that is quoted extensively by Snopes.

(To be fair, it must be noted that Hochberg took his position as head of the Bank after the loan was approved. Still, the criteria he uses to justify the Petrobras loan does not seem to comport with the Ex-Im Bank’s decision under his purview in this Wisconsin/India deal.)


The Ex-Im/Petrobras deal has not been finalized. According to Hochberg in July of 2009, “Final approval follows receipt of a final commitment application, review by Ex-Im Bank staff and final action by the Bank’s board of directors. ”

Hochberg justifies the transaction, so we know that he is ostensibly in favor of it and likely will not overturn the final approval when Petrobras sends in its final commitment application(s) (if they have yet to do so). What is important to note is that Ex-Im’s press release that claims Bush appointees approved the loan is misleading, because it hides the fact that Hochberg’s bank could still deny final approval. Snopes does not mention this.

Additionally, Obama can call the whole thing off. No matter how politically isolated the Ex-Im Bank might be painted, revisit the Wisconsin/India case for a quick foray into Obama’s influence over the bank’s decision to approve the loan:

“The reversal came just in time for a visit by President Barack Obama Wednesday to Wisconsin, the home base of Bucyrus International Inc. [Wisconsin company], which hopes to sell the mining equipment to Reliance [Indian company] with the help of loan guarantees.”

But instead of preventing the Petrobras deal from going through, the Ex-Im bank raised the value of the preliminary loan from $2 billion to $10 billion (that is still with a “B”). According to the Latin American Herald Tribune:

The U.S. government is preparing to provide up to $10 billion in loans to finance the development of massive hydrocarbon reserves off Brazil’s coast thought to contain 80 billion barrels of high-quality crude, an amount that could lead to a six-fold increase in Brazil’s current proven reserves and transform that nation into one of the world’s 10 largest oil producers. [my emphasis]

So this loan is meant to help Petrobras become an oil powerhouse. And…

President Barack Obama’s national security adviser, Gen. James Jones, discussed the matter with officials this week [August 2009] during a visit to the South American country, Brazilian Planning Minister Paulo Bernardo da Silva told reporters.

…In case you were still wondering how much control or oversight the Obama administration had over any of this.

The $10 billion figure, by the by, matches the Chinese government’s loan to Brazil, which, Snopes makes sure to point out, was five times the amount of the Ex-Im loan.

Totally. False.

Snopes also discusses Glenn Beck’s statement that “The Chinese government is under contract to purchase all the oil that this oil field will produce, which is hundreds of millions of barrels of oil.” But then they do the following lackluster myth-busting:

China does have an agreement to buy Brazilian oil from Petrobras, but not literally to purchase the entire output of Brazilian offshore oil fields. In May 2009, the China Development Bank (CDB) agreed to lend Petrobras $10 billion (five times the amount of the Ex-Im loan); in exchange, “the two sides agreed to increase actual crude oil exports from Brazil to China.” At the same time, Petrobras and Sinopec (the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation) signed a separate long-term export agreement providing for Petrobras to export 200,000 barrels of oil to China per day from 2010 to 2019.

Was this an attempt to try to disprove Beck? This literally amounts to an admission that China stands to profit much more from their Petrobras deal than the United States does. In fact, the U.S. did not receive any guarantees of oil from their loan transaction.


It seems safe to take Ex-Im Bank’s word for the fact that U.S. jobs stand to profit from the Petrobras loan. The Bank claims that the money will only be given to Petrobras for products that they buy from the United States. I see no reason to disbelieve this.

Additionally, Ex-Im Bank claims, “the bank is self-sustaining and does not receive any appropriated funds from Congress.” Just above, Ex-Im notes, “The vast majority of our financing consists of guarantees of loans made by commercial lenders.” I don’t know what they mean by “vast majority,” or from where the rest of the (possibly taxpayer-subsidized?) money might arise, but I do not have any concrete reason for serious doubt.

Furthermore, I have found no hard evidence to establish that Obama spearheaded this decision. However it would be irresponsible to discount this as a possibility. Either way, I have shown above the influence he wields over the loan (at least) after the initial approval.

The bad news is that which remains public knowledge:

(a) George Soros’s largest holding at the time of the initial loan and currently is invested in Petrobras;

(b) $10bil from the U.S. federal government are on the table to help Petrobras explore potentially lucrative oil mines;

(c) Petrobras has been salivating for Gulf drilling rigs since the spill in April, so much so that it is looking for more financing to expand its drilling operations;

(d) The U.S. government’s Gulf oil moratorium has effectively given the drilling rigs an incentive to go elsewhere (at the time of this writing, two rigs have already migrated to Egypt and the Congo). Drilling rigs that leave are not expected to return for years, leaving the Gulf with less rigs and potentially older and more dangerous models;

(e) Tens of thousands of jobs are currently in limbo in the Gulf oil industry, as are tens of millions of barrels of oil. The fishing industry in the Gulf is stalled, and the tourism industry has taken a hit.


This administration has proven that it is deathly against U.S. oil drilling (especially after the BP spill), particularly when it comes to deepwater drilling. And yet, they are willing to send money to Brazil to drill even deeper. Whether or not this move helps U.S. jobs, the irony is too great to write it off as merely an employment booster.

The irony only becomes sinister when we consider that this loan is meant to boost the capabilities of a company that, until just recently, had been George Soros’s greatest asset for two years. It is now his second largest asset.

Final pronouncement on Snopes: Disappointingly False.

(For the record, I remain unabashedly loyal to Wikipedia.)

for serious doubt